As academic lead for medical ethics and professionalism, Demian is centrally involved in: curricula design and development; organising and delivering teaching courses and sessions on ethics, philosophy of medicine, and medical law (face-to-face and online lectures, small group seminars, large group workshops, student-led learning); developing ways of helping students develop professionalism (including use of reflective portfolios); and developing written and non-written forms of assessment.
Demian Whiting is Senior Lecturer in Medical Ethics and Professionalism and Academic Lead for Professionalism at Hull York Medical School. He obtained a PhD in Philosophy in 2002 before taking up the position of Lecturer in Health Care Ethics at Liverpool University. He moved to Hull in April 2011.
Demian's research interests include philosophy of emotion, phenomenal consciousness, moral psychology, and various issues in medical ethics.. He is particularly interested in the nature of emotion (he endorses the much-disputed view that emotions are non-representational/non intentional feeling states) and how emotion might connect to motivation, moral thought, and the self, and has recently published a book that explores these themes. He is interested also in phenomenal consciousness, including whether there is an appearance/reality distinction in the case of conscious mental states and the way they feel to us (he argues there is not), and the question of whether phenomenal consciousness is the real mark of the mental (he thinks it is).
Links to published works can be found here: PhilPapers Profile
Book
Whiting, D (2020). Emotions as original existences: a theory of emotion, motivation, and the self. Palgrave Macmillan
Book Chapter
Whiting, D (2018). Consciousness and emotion. In The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness, ed. Rocco J Gennaro. London. Routledge.
Articles
Whiting, D (2020). Traumatic brain injury with personality change: a challenge for mental capacity law in England and Wales. Psychological Injury and Law. Vol 13, 2020, 11-18
Whiting, D (2018). Emotion as the categorical basis for moral thought. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 31, 2018, 533-553.
Brown S., Whiting D, Fielden H, Saini P, Beesley H, Holcombe C, Holcombe S, Greenhalgh L, Fairburn L, Salmon P (2017). Qualitative analysis of how patients decide that they want risk-reducing mastectomy, and the implications for surgeons in responding to emotionally-motivated patient requests. Plos One.12(5)
Whiting D (2016). On the appearance and reality of mind. Journal of Mind and Behavior. 37(1): 47-70.
Whiting D (2015). Evaluating medico-legal decisional competency criteria. Health Care Analysis. 23(2): 181-196.
Brown S and Whiting D (2014). The ethics of distress: toward a framework for determining the ethical acceptability of distressing health promotion advertising. International Journal of Psychology. 49(2):89-97.
Whiting D (2012). Are emotions perceptual experiences of value? Ratio. 25(1):93-107.
Whiting D (2011) Review of Embodiment, emotion, and cognition by Michelle Maiese. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 11 (Invited review)
Whiting D (2011). Abortion and referral: is the law in need of changing? Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 17 (5):1006-1008
Whiting D (2011). The feeling theory of emotion and the object-directed emotions. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-3035 (3):130-135
Whiting D (2010). Serious professional misconduct and the need for an apology Clinical Ethics. 5 (3):130-135
Whiting D (2009). Does decision-making capacity require the absence of pathological values? Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 16: 341-344
Whiting D (2009). Should doctors ever be professionally required to change their attitudes? Clinical Ethics, 4: 67-73
Whiting D (2007). Inappropriate attitudes, fitness to practice, and the challenges facing medical educators. Journal of Medical Ethics, 33: 67-670
Whiting D (2006). Some more reflections on emotions, thoughts, and therapy. Philosophy, Psychiatry,and Psychology, 13: 255-257
Whiting D (2006). Why treating problems in emotion may not require altering eliciting cognitions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13: 237-246
Whiting D (2006). Standing up for an affective account of emotion. Philosophical Explorations, 9: 261-276
Whiting D (2004). Emotional disorder. Ratio, 17: 90-103